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The aims of this paper1 are twofold. First, I explain the economics of bankbailouts as distinct from bailouts for other sectors of the economy. Why do
all the rules of good competition policy appear to fly out of the window when
the banks get into trouble? Does this mean that we should abandon the rules
equally for car manufacturers and other industries in trouble? I argue that a
unique combination of two characteristics made it essential to bailout or
nationalize the banks in the current crisis. No other sector of the economy can
claim the same justification. Second, I review the threat of a retreat to politi-
cally-determined industrial policy and the need for vigilant implementation of
economic effects-based competition policy.
*Bruce Lyons is Professor of Economics in the School of Economics at UEA and Deputy Director of the
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia.
Competition Policy International26
I. The Credit Crunch
The current global economic crisis had its roots in slack economic policy and
huge strategic errors by the banks.2 Permitted by weak regulation and driven by
biased incentives, the banks borrowed (and lent) far too much given their low
capital bases, and were caught out when the housing price bubble began to burst,
heralding large-scale defaults. The global reach of this behavior was compound-
ed by the sale and purchase of opaque mortgage-backed securities and their
derivatives between financial institutions. The banks’ recklessness was facilitat-
ed by weak corporate governance, ineffective regulation, permissive monetary
policy, and massive international flows of funds.3 Like unlimited supply of food
in the animal kingdom, huge flows of funds into
western banks suppressed the power of competi-
tion to select only the fittest to survive.
Similarly, rapid recession, like periods of limited
food, soon picks off the unfit and, if the drought
is severe, many of the fit as well.
There have been two enormous market conse-
quences of these events and a third may be
round the corner. The first was that many of the
world’s most renowned banks have been pushed close to bankruptcy. For some,
this was the direct result of their own recklessness, but others have been sucked
into the whirlpool. Governments across the world have stepped in to bail them
out by guaranteeing loans, injecting capital, underwriting toxic assets, and
acquiring their shares. Such has been this commitment that only one bank of
major significance has so far gone bust (Lehman Bros). This “success” has been
achieved only at huge cost to current and future taxpayers.
The second consequence was contagion into the non-financial sectors of the
economy. The banks cut lending in every way they could in order to rebuild their
reserves.4 This created severe financial constraints for their business and private
customers, resulting in investment cuts, reduced demand, and a powerful nega-
tive multiplier across the global economy. Beyond financial constraints, con-
sumer and investor confidence were shattered creating a further squeeze on
demand. Fearing a Japanese style “lost decade” of deflation and stagnation, gov-
ernments and monetary authorities have been trying to reverse this by slashing
interest rates, buying securities, increasing public spending, and temporarily
reducing taxes. Much of this may have been necessary as an emergency measure,
even though the haste, panic, and haggling with which such packages were put
together suggests many initiatives will have been substantially wasteful.
The third potential consequence could be an interventionist industrial policy
in the wider economy and the emasculation of competition policy. Currently,
this has happened only to a minor extent, but aspects of rescue packages promot-
ed by governments across the globe point to the danger. In the last decade, com-
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petition policy has been reinvented across Europe5 and introduced in many
emerging economies with vigor and new focus on economic foundations. This
has been a huge success in protecting consumer-responsive markets and efficient
business practices. The discipline of competition policy has also allowed the
reduction of inefficient forms of regulation and public ownership. While modern
competition policy is economically robust, it remains politically fragile and thus
vulnerable to crude, populist, deeply-flawed claims that it is an unnecessary lux-
ury in times of recession—or even that the crisis itself is due to “too much com-
petition.” A more considered analysis shows this to be untrue, but it is all too
easy to see why the mistaken view might take root.
The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I explain the economics of bank
bailouts and why they are different from bailouts for other sectors of the econo-
my. Second, I review the threat of a retreat to politically-determined industrial
policy and opportunities for the implementation of an active competition poli-
cy. Section 2 highlights a unique combination of two characteristics that made
it essential to bailout or nationalize banks in the recent crisis. In section 3, I
assess the dangers of bailing out failing firms in sectors that do not exhibit both
these characteristics. The recent trend in interventions and the positive role of
competition policy during the recession are reviewed in section 4. Section 5 pres-
ents a brief conclusion.
II. Bailouts, Nationalization, and Regulation for
Banks6
A. CAUSES
After years of lecturing and lobbying from the West, China adopted its new
Anti-Monopoly Law only last year (2008). China may, therefore, be puzzled to
see so much government intervention in banks in recent months, including:
massive individualized subsidies, direct “inter-
ference” in business decisions, politicians pro-
moting mergers, and nationalization.7 Why do
all the rules of good competition policy appear
to fly out of the window when the banks get
into trouble? Does this mean that we should
abandon the rules equally for car manufacturers and other firms or industries in
trouble? I address the first question in the remainder of this section and the sec-
ond in section 3.
All markets have their own idiosyncrasies but each works fundamentally in
the same way. Only rarely are the idiosyncrasies so substantial that they warrant
special treatment. It is an unfortunate truth that banking is different to other
industries due to a unique combination of two essential characteristics that cre-
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ate the potential for systemic economic collapse: contagion within the banking
sector and contagion from banks to the entire real economy. Before getting to
these twin contagions, note the importance of confidence and potential for
panic in banking.
A bank can only survive if everyone is pretty certain that it will survive. It can-
not survive a loss of confidence.8 Banks necessarily borrow short (i.e. customers
can withdraw their money at short notice) and lend long, which means they
must rely on funder confidence to keep funds flowing in to support their loan
book. Banks lend a multiple of what has been deposited and can do this in nor-
mal times because most people leave much of their money in the bank. However,
in the absence of full guarantees, individual savers have a great deal to lose if a
bank goes bust and very little to gain by keeping their money in a particular
bank. Even a rumor of potential failure can result in massive withdrawals and, in
the absence of intervention, failure is a self-fulfilling prophesy. This can happen
even if a bank’s loan book is sound because the bank will not have the liquidity
to pay all depositors their money.
The problem moves from liquidity crisis to a much more serious insolvency cri-
sis when loans go bad and the bank has insufficient capital to absorb losses.
Depositors could not be paid out even if all the good loans could be called in.
The loss of confidence cannot then be soothed. The queues outside Northern
Rock in the United Kingdom in September 2007 were an early sign of the fragili-
ty of the banking system even when most retail depositors were covered by an
explicit government guarantee. Wholesale funds from other banks and interna-
tional lenders were quantitatively much more important and unguaranteed, and
it was these that hemorrhaged from Northern Rock to bring it down. Few other
products are so sensitive to confidence.9 Nevertheless, banks would not warrant
special treatment if this was the end of the story because creditors could simply
move their deposits to a rival bank which could consequently increase its loans.
The first truly distinctive characteristic of banking from the competition per-
spective is that the balance sheet of banks are so interconnected that the col-
lapse of a large bank is contagious and contaminates the whole banking system.
To a small extent this is because funders (from small retail depositors to interna-
tional wholesale funds) wonder which will be the next troubled bank from which
they should withdraw their funds. But if the crisis was merely one of confidence,
that worry could easily be addressed by the central bank providing liquidity to a
bank subject to a run. For relatively small bank failures, when banks have ade-
quate capital and when specific risks and reasons for failure are understood, the
banking system is typically quite stable.10
Banks in highly developed economies do not fail due to liquidity problems
alone, but they are interconnected in more significant ways. Banks lend to each
other so if one is unable to repay its debts, that failure creates bad debts the lend-
ing bank which, in turn, undermines its solvency (counterparty risk). Before the
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current crisis, most banks had shared a similar belief about continuing asset price
rises and they did not diversify the associated risk sufficiently outside the bank-
ing system. Instead, they exchanged ever more complex and opaque collateral-
ized debt obligations, most importantly those based on mortgages. The risks
stayed within the system.
In August 2007, the banks apparently suddenly noticed the rising mortgage
repayment delinquencies and foreclosures as house price inflation tumbled. They
stopped lending to each other, justifiably concerned that they could not calcu-
late the risks in their own balance sheets, let alone those of counterparties. The
self-inflicted wounds of inadequate capital, bad loans notably in U.S. subprime
mortgages, and foolish trading in derivatives spread the damage and destroyed
the already limited capital of many banks and related financial institutions.11
Like firms in all industries, banks go bust when their capital is exhausted by bad
trading but, because of the interconnectivity
between banks, bad loans and bad assets quick-
ly spread through the global banking system.
The banking crisis lurched towards potential
catastrophe a year to the day after those
Northern Rock queues on U.K. high streets,
when the major U.S. bank Lehman Bros was
allowed to collapse and the global financial sys-
tem nearly followed. In simple economic terms,
this first distinctive characteristic is that a large
bank with substantial trading activities has a
negative externality on its rivals—if it collapses, the stability of its rivals is
undermined.12 This is in sharp contrast to, say, a grocer or a car manufacturer
where others in the industry can usually benefit from the collapse of a rival.13
The second distinctive characteristic is that bank finance provides the essen-
tial oil in the entire economic system, allowing firms to make investments and
to absorb the bumps of fluctuating revenues and payments. In normal times,
banks lend to each other for exactly the same reason. Additionally, traditional
investment banking puts together funding for bigger projects. Without this oil
provided by the banks, the economy seizes up. The product of no other indus-
try is as essential to every other market in the system. Banks are particularly
important for smaller firms which do not have the scale to issue corporate bonds
and do not have access to the internal capital markets of large business groups.14
They are also important for financing large purchases by consumers (e.g. hous-
ing, cars). Unfortunately, during a banking crisis, the first reaction of a bank is
to stop making loans in order to compensate for its loss of deposits and asset
write-offs. If the banks thus fail to fulfill their crucial lending function, this
leads to a fall in demand and macroeconomic recession. This is the second
dimension of contagion.15
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Thus, the deposit-side of banks is vulnerable to contagion in the withdrawal of
funds and especially asset write-downs, and the consequent loan-side collapse
contaminates the whole economy as banks try to rebuild their balance sheets.
These two characteristics combined into a compelling argument for treating the
banks as a special case in the current crisis. The prospect of contagious bank fail-
ures justifies intervention both to provide them with liquidity and to keep them
solvent. However bitter the taste to taxpayers, this applies even when the banks’
plight is their own fault.
This double contagion is unique. A food product may be vulnerable to a health
scare and a contagious loss of confidence for that particular product, but this
would not result in global recession if it was taken off the supermarket shelves.16
Electricity may be required for the production of practically every other product
in the economy, but it does not suffer from within-sector contagion—electricity
supply did not collapse with Enron and would be little affected by the bankrupt-
cy of a major supplier. Only the banking system combines both of these charac-
teristics to create the potential for genuinely systemic contagion. A detonator
alone makes only a small bang, and TNT alone is a relatively stable material, but
put the two together and you have a truly dangerous bomb. As it is, the banking
crisis detonated a huge bomb under the global economy. The collapse of anoth-
er major bank could have been nuclear. There
was no sensible alternative but to bail out or
nationalize failing major banks.17
There is one more twist to the story. This spe-
cialness of banks has been a substantial cause of
the crisis. The major banks are now sure of what they already thought they knew:
they will always be bailed out. The shock of the Lehman collapse was the exception
that only served to prove the government guarantee. The consequences of collapse
were seen to be so awful that governments have bailed out the banks ever since.
The anticipation of this bailout had created a moral hazard that biased deci-
sions towards risk taking. The upside for banks was huge potential profits and the
downside was a bailout. This asymmetry was reflected in the bonus structure for
executives and the traders they employed. The reward for short-term trading suc-
cess was huge, while there was no equivalent sacrifice for having made losses and
no claw-back for short-term profitable trades that turn sour. This system allowed
banks to share the same bullish beliefs in asset prices without diversifying the risk
outside the banking system. It also encouraged heavy duty lobbying to reduce the
effectiveness of regulation. Some banks did remain prudent, but others compet-
ed on upside alone.18
B. SOLUTIONS
Having identified some of the problems, what should have been done to solve
them? In the short term, the urgency should have been to get banks lending
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again and so to limit the contagion of the banking crisis to the rest of the econ-
omy. Most governments tried to do this indirectly by recapitalizing the banks,
often in return for some form of preferred stock (i.e. something between a stan-
dard loan and common equity). This allowed them to say that a bank was not
being nationalized even when the taxpayer became the majority stock holder
and took a high risk of not being repaid.
Governments have also provided credit insurance and toxic asset underwriting
(ex post i.e. after the assets had turned toxic!) and central banks have purchased
large quantities of bonds from the banks.19 While this bailout has saved many
banks from collapse, it did not get them lending again on a sufficient scale and
urgency. These banks have instead used this funding to rebuild their own capital
while they operated in the shadow of collapse.
This created “zombie banks” which drain funds
while failing to fulfill their raison d’être.
Government loan guarantees have also failed
to stimulate lending on a significant scale.
Unfortunately, against this limited success, the
bailouts will further reinforce the asymmetry in risk-taking by banks once more
normal times return. Meanwhile, the banks’ self-preservation measures made the
recession bite harder, thus “justifying” their failure to lend to businesses by claim-
ing that those businesses have become too risky.
There would have been less contagion into the real economy if a form of tem-
porary nationalization (beyond passive ownership of preference shares) had been
adopted early in the crisis. The idea would be for those banks which were nation-
alized to be run by trustees and concentrate on traditional lending based on
investment and repayment prospects. It would draw on the traditional skills and
expertise of bankers in assessing loans and creditworthiness, but importantly
should not undercut terms provided by private lenders in normal times. Their
loans would be made on full commercial terms and such banks would be priva-
tized as soon as economic conditions permitted.
Had such nationalization been adopted in late 2008, this would have limited
the contagion into the real sector.20 Competition authorities could have been
instructed to monitor that each nationalized bank was indeed operating on gen-
uine commercial terms both in attracting funds and in lending activities.21
There are major problems with such a strategy both in the process of nation-
alization and in the State running a commercial bank. Nationalization of a bank
that would be bankrupt in the absence of government help would, quite fairly
and efficiently, wipe out the common shareholders and reduce the payout for
junior creditors. It would probably also cause shareholders and subordinated
creditors of some other banks to flee in anticipation of nationalization. This
means that several major but weak banks would have to be nationalized simulta-
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neously. This would undoubtedly be politically uncomfortable. Since pension
and insurance funds also invest in banks, the spillover could be far-reaching and
the state may have to absorb some of the creditor losses to keep otherwise well-
managed insurance companies afloat. However, there is no reason to provide
such insurance to shareholders in general.
It has to be acknowledged that the aim of a nationalized bank to make loans
only on commercial terms has limited credibility because politicians are geneti-
cally prone to fiddling with any high profile asset they own. This certainly hap-
pens under long-term state ownership but not
necessarily over the short term. This problem
must be balanced against the prospect of “stan-
dard” bailouts creating zombie banks that are
not lending and so causing a protracted reces-
sion.22 As soon as the economy recovers and an
appropriate regulatory regime has been estab-
lished, these banks should be privatized, though
in a restructured form to minimize the risk of
future contagious bank failures.
These rapidly privatized banks should proba-
bly be much smaller than the ones that failed,
and so less prone to causing future systemic collapse. This would help to balance
the sharp increase in bank concentration that has been a consequence of the cri-
sis. For example, in the United States, we have seen the consolidation of: Bank
of America, Countrywide, and Merrill Lynch; JP Morgan, Washington Mutual
and Bear Stearns; Wells Fargo and Wachovia. In the United Kingdom: Lloyds
TSB and HBoS; Santander and Bradford & Bingley; Nationwide and
Dunfermline;23 while Northern Rock has been the only conventional national-
ization. Internationally, Lehman assets were picked up by Barclays (United
Kingdom and United States) and Nomura (Asia). No one can seriously claim
that this change in banking market structure has been due to the natural market
forces that should rightly shape an efficient market structure.
In the medium term, major revisions of bank regulation are necessary so that
banks can compete as private firms with balanced incentives. Financial markets
are not unique in having special features that require a specific regulatory frame-
work to align competition and welfare. For example, some industries (e.g. infra-
structure networks distributing electricity, water, or rail services) are subject to
such strong economies of scale that they are natural monopolies and so require a
specialist regulator to control maximum prices; but banks do not have such strong
scale or network economies to make them anywhere near natural monopolies.
A more relevant example is pharmaceuticals, for which there are powerful
health and safety reasons to regulate new drugs. In late 1950s Europe, this regu-
lation was entirely insufficient, with the result that thalidomide was prescribed
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to pregnant women. The resultant tragedy brought about a new and necessary
regulatory approval regime, subject to which pharmaceutical companies can
compete with each other.24 It is essential that the current crisis should similarly
bring about more effective and appropriate financial regulation while still
encouraging beneficial competition and innovation.
An international regulatory system already existed pre-crisis with a view to set-
ting minimum standards for banks and so to channeling competition into appro-
priate behavior. This took the form of the agreement known as Basel II, which
has three “pillars:” minimum capital requirements, regulatory supervision, and
risk disclosure to facilitate market discipline.25 Clearly, the application of this
framework has proved inadequate in the face of complex financial innovations
and distorted incentives.
The following elements of regulation are additional to a necessary review of
the standard components of Basel II.26 First, incentives given to individuals with-
in banks must not be one-sided (i.e. paying
bonuses for short-term profit with no downside
for long-term losses). Recent European debate
has been side-tracked into crude proposals to
limit the scale of bonuses, whereas it is their
incentive effect that is crucial.
Second, while credit default swaps and other
elements of diversification and insurance must
be allowed as prudent trading activities, they should not be traded by banks mul-
tiple times as bets on future prices or defaults.27 Liquid markets also need to be
created to get genuine prices for all supposedly safe assets.
Third, banks should be charged ex ante (i.e. before they get into a mess) for
the explicit (and implicit) guarantees they receive from government, and the size
of these charges should reflect the risk profile chosen by each particular bank,
including the amount of debt financing relative to its equity base.28
Fourth, idiosyncratic assets, collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), and
other complex or opaque financial innovations might be required to pass regula-
tory scrutiny and receive positive approval from a regulatory body, and not from
a credit rating agency which is beholden to issuers for fees and supplementary
services.29 Credit ratings could be privatized at a later date once an appropriate
regulatory regime is established.
Finally, and arguably most important, a credible bankruptcy regime must be
established for banks so that contagion is contained. This is likely to require pre-
emptive action by a monitoring central bank (and not the daily regulator which
may be reluctant to admit that it has failed to keep the bank on track).
Competition Policy, Bailouts, and the Economic Crisis
RECENT EUROPEAN DEBATE
HAS BEEN SIDE-TRACKED
INTO CRUDE PROPOSALS TO
LIMIT THE SCALE OF BONUSES,
WHEREAS IT IS THEIR INCENTIVE
EFFECT THAT IS CRUCIAL.
Competition Policy International34
In conclusion, the banking system combines the two explosive characteristics
of contagious failures and universal need by every other business. This combi-
nation means that major banks cannot be allowed to fail. The risk this entails
and the recklessness it encourages mean that tough prudential regulation is
essential. This is all the more important because recent bailouts only reinforce
the moral hazard.
However, it is important to regulate appropriately so as not to stifle competi-
tion and innovation. This requires targeting regulation clearly at the problems
(e.g. externalities, distorted incentives) and not a knee-jerk political response
against the wrong target (e.g. competition, securities to diversify risks). With
appropriate regulation and the standard tools of competition policy in place,
competition among private banks can be left to work to the benefit of efficient
businesses and consumers. The appropriate regulatory framework is necessary to
align competition and welfare, bringing sustainably low prices for banking serv-
ices and safe, innovative product development.
Finally, there is no reason why a government should not use their ‘bailout’
stakes in banks to restructure them into less contagion-prone (probably smaller)
institutions. In Europe, the Commission is likely to use its state aid powers to
require some degree of restructuring, but it remains to be seen whether this will
be designed as an ad hoc punishment or a genuine attempt to redress properly
identified problems.
III. Competition Versus Bailouts for the Rest of
the Economy
The banking crisis stifled lending and the consequent credit crunch triggered a
global recession. Minor banking crises do not always bite on the real economy,
but history tells us that when a banking crisis does bite, it bites the economy’s leg
off. We are very much in the latter category today. A comprehensive IMF study
of all systemically important banking crises for the period 1970 to 2007 covering
42 crises in 37 countries shows the average fiscal costs of crisis management to
be 13 percent GDP, though they can be as high as 55 percent.30 The consequent
recessions are even more damaging with average cumulative losses equivalent to
20 percent GDP in the first four years, but ranging from 0-98percent GDP.31
It is from this perspective that we must view the massive fiscal stimuli that
many governments put in place as an attempt to limit the decline and shorten
the period of stagnation. The size of required fiscal stimulus could have been
much less if bank finance was working properly. Even on an optimistic scenario,
however, there will be a deep and protracted recession that is seeing numerous
firms fighting for their survival. In these circumstances, should we abandon com-
petition policy, particularly as it relates to state aid? I consider only aid to specif-
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ic firms or industries, and not general fiscal or employment measures that are rea-
sonably neutral in their impact on competition.32
Competitive markets certainly work to the benefit of consumers and efficient
firms when financial markets are oiling them well. In good times, firms expand
and enter new markets as they seek to attract customers and spending away from
rivals. Profits are made by those who have invested well, produce efficiently, and
make the most attractive product offers (i.e. those who provide what consumers
want at a better price than offered by rivals). In bad times, firms contract and
leave the market as they adjust to reduced customer spending. Losses are made
by those who fail to provide what their customers want or who set prices that are
too high (i.e. those who make unattractive offers).
Firms with the least attractive products or highest costs exit the market. Exit
is as fundamental as entry in making markets work well. It is part of natural selec-
tion, leaving room for efficient firms to expand and new firms to enter. The same
essential story applies to shops, restaurants, steel and cars. The role of competi-
tion policy is to ensure that firms do not conspire to evade this harsh but social-
ly productive competitive discipline by fixing prices, excluding efficient rivals,
merging with significant competitors, or receiving discriminatory state subsidies
or protection.
In the absence of the special features discussed in section 2, subsidies under-
mine market outcomes and processes.33 The problem most familiar to the
European debate on State aid is that subsidies create international distortions to
competition. Inefficient firms receiving subsidies take market share from more
efficient foreign suppliers. This can result in
retaliation and a mutually destructive subsidy
war funded by taxpayers.
However, the problems are not only interna-
tional. Subsidies undermine the market mecha-
nism because the prospect of a bailout leads to
reckless behavior, as is so vividly illustrated by
the banks. It also leads to “rent seeking” as the most successful CEOs become
those who can best work the political system for subsidies, and not those who
efficiently produce the best and most innovative products. There is abundant
evidence of the failure of politicians or civil servants to pick winners. More insid-
iously, there is also a negative effect on efficient firms and entrants who are
incentivized to hold back on investment and aggressive marketing if they know
that inefficient rivals will hang on to segments of the market with inappropriate
product offers and bloated capacity without fear of the consequences.
In structurally competitive industries (i.e. in the absence of sunk costs, state
subsidies, or entry barriers), entry into and exit from a market can rapidly adjust
to demand changes. Firms respond to expected prices relative to average costs to
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trigger entry and exit. Incentives change in the presence of sunk (i.e. non-recov-
erable) costs; for example, not only will they want to stay in the market as long
as variable (non-sunk) costs are covered, but they may want to hang on even if
price falls below these costs as long as there is a prospect of the market recover-
ing.34 Thus, firms will be more cautious to enter and slower to exit. This provides
a natural balance for such markets with less entry when demand is high and less
exit in recession. Profits in good times balance losses in bad times and properly
working financial markets will appreciate this and provide the necessary finan-
cial buffer.
Both economic theory and most of the empirical evidence suggest that an
unhindered exit process is at least reasonably efficient.35 The research shows that
in the absence of intervention the market selects the best adapted firms to sur-
vive. The least efficient plants exit first, includ-
ing those too small to achieve available
economies of scale. If firms are equally efficient,
then the largest downsize first. Once these
adjustments have been made, if demand is insuf-
ficient relative to economies of scale and the
toughness of competition, there may be a period
of attrition with prices below cost until one of the remaining firms exits. This is
a painful process for all in the industry and the transaction costs are substantial
but it has the desirable attribute of leaving a sustainably efficient and competi-
tive market structure.36
How do things change when financial markets fail to provide lubrication and
instead throw grit into the economic system? Problems can be caused at two lev-
els. First, banks and other providers of finance play a vital role in appraising
investment projects and the long-term viability of firms. It is possible that arbi-
trary financial constraints due to the banking crisis might force the exit of a firm
that serves consumers better than a rival; yet the inefficient rival might survive
because it happens to have a stronger line of credit.37 Second, financial con-
straints on customers may depress demand for a whole sector if purchases are
widely funded by borrowing (e.g. construction, cars, machinery), which might
result in the scrapping of skills and assets that would be productive once the
credit crunch clears.
These possibilities only serve to emphasize the need to get banks lending. As
argued earlier, recapitalizations and loan guarantees have proved expensive yet
insufficient to indirectly get the banks to lend. It would have been better had the
governments taken active control of those banks they are subsidizing. These
banks could have been run by independent trustees for the duration of the reces-
sion and with a policy of lending on “market investor” unsubsidized terms.38 The
idea is to correct the cause of the problem, the credit crunch, and to avoid giv-
ing politically determined subsidies to specific firms or industries. The resultant
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loan book would then be attractive when the bank is privatized as soon as the
market conditions allow.
There are two highly unattractive alternatives. Either no intervention, so com-
petition is distorted and firms reliant on bank funding are affected asymmetrical-
ly, or finance determined by the “Department for Industry” where firms will be
helped according to political impact and not according to previous reliance on
bank funding.39 The key lending skills lie within the banking sector whereas gov-
ernment departments find an easy route through grand gestures to big firms and
big industries (even if the recipients were in long-term decline pre credit crunch).
With appropriate measures to get banks lending, are some “real sector” firms
still “too big to fail” in a recession? “Too big” may be interpreted in several ways.
The firm might be a monopoly provider, a large direct employer, or a firm sup-
porting a large supply chain or distribution network. For a monopoly provider
such as the owner of a rail network or a vital tunnel, the asset does not disappear
if the owner gets in financial difficulty. If the assets have any positive value they
can be bought out of administration and operated under new ownership. If the
firm is not a monopoly but a large employer, then its viable assets could also be
bought out of administration. It is inefficient to subsidize current shareholders
and it would be harmful if it received preferen-
tial treatment over an efficient rival. The same
argument applies to a long supply chain in, for
example, the car industry.
More subtly, it is possible that an efficient and
an inefficient manufacturer may share key sup-
pliers who benefit from economies of scale. The loss of a major customer may put
such suppliers at risk and so potentially harm the efficient manufacturer’s supply
chain. However, an efficient supplier can respond by expanding into the market
opportunities created by the exit of the inefficient firm and scaling down.40 This
is the way markets work to select efficient producers and subsidies interfere with
this process. Subsidies to support a whole industry may appear less distortionary,
but they inevitably divert demand and resources away from substitute products
and so shift the pain. No other sector of the economy shares the pair of charac-
teristics that set banks apart for state intervention in the current crisis.41
There is no doubt that restructuring is painful. However, the pain is less than
the harm caused by industrial subsidies, as experienced by: efficient rivals who
suffer reduced market share; customers who are offered costly and unattractive
products; taxpayers whose real income falls; or the elderly, the sick, and school
children who suffer from diverted public spending. It is important that those
thrown out of work should receive strong support both financially and in retrain-
ing, but it is they who should receive the subsidies and not the shareholders and
senior executives of failing firms. It is the latter who benefit most from bailouts.
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IV. The Positive Role for Competition Policy
During the Recession
Most of the analysis so far has related to State aid because this is the competition
policy front line in a recession. History provides some worrying lessons also for
other dimensions of competition policy. Anticompetitive agreements and merg-
ers cause long-term harm which gets discounted heavily in a crisis. In interna-
tional trade policy, there is a well known and strong correlation between reces-
sion and protection, with causation going both ways and feeding a negative spi-
ral.42 Effective enforcement of national competition policy in most of the world
is relatively recent, so has yet to be challenged by recession. However, the
United States has had the Sherman Act since 1890 and the last 120 years have
seen numerous wars and slumps. Both types of crisis have dampened enforcement
of the Act and the consequences have been par-
ticularly bad during recessions. Business cooper-
ation can be bought (superficially cheaply) by
politicians: “Antitrust laxity is often the govern-
ment’s first bargaining chip when it urgently
needs something from industry.”43
Much has been made of the similarities
between the current crisis and the Great
Depression, especially the fiscal role of the New
Deal. A closer look, however, does not settle
one’s nerves.44 Franklin D. Roosevelt was per-
suaded by industrialists that it was necessary to suppress the enforcement of com-
petition policy to gain cooperation and he agreed to this as an integral part of the
deal. In twelve months from June 1935, the Interior Department received iden-
tical bids from steel firms on 257 different occasions, and these bids were 50 per-
cent higher than foreign steel prices. It has been estimated that wholesale prices
in 1935 were 24 percent higher than they should have been and even by 1939
they remained 14 percent higher. Cartel prices fed through to unrealistic wages
and Cole & Ohanian estimate that unemployment was 25 percent higher than
it would have been otherwise. They suggest that the depression may have lasted
seven years longer than necessary.45
Fortunately, international institutions facilitating political and economic dia-
logue are now well established and genuinely global (e.g. WTO, G20), as has
been made necessary by global economic integration. This has undoubtedly
helped with the initial responses and rhetoric of policy intervention. However,
there are dangerous signs. In the United Kingdom in October 2008, the Office
of Fair Trading (“OFT”) recommended that the Competition Commission
should investigate the proposed merger of Lloyds-TSB and HBOS, but this
advice was overridden by the Secretary of State.46 This was the first case of such
an intervention since the reforming Enterprise Act of 2002 was meant to take
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mergers out of political decision making.47 The merger has turned out to be a
financial disaster and the interventions discussed in section 2 would undoubted-
ly have been better. As it stands, the United Kingdom (like the United States)
now has a more concentrated banking structure which will be even more vulner-
able to systemic failure unless prudential regulation is very much improved.
In spring 2009, politicians across the globe were thinking loudly about subsi-
dizing specific firms, particularly in the car industry. The U.S. administration
offered major subsidies to General Motors and Chrysler, though in the end not
enough to stop them filing for bankruptcy protection. In France, President
Sarkozy offered 6 billion EUROs in government support for Renault and
Peugeot-Citroen subject to two conditions—no factories located in France
would be closed and reassurance regarding jobs in France—before the European
Commission intervened. Italy and Spain also produced major car subsidy plans.
Intervention then switched to apparently more neutral car scrappage schemes to
stimulate demand (though this is still biased towards the car sector and is a cost-
ly way of bringing forward the purchase of a durable good at the expense of lower
demand next year).
More widely, the traditional instruments of trade protection are also visible.
For example, tariffs were raised in India on some steel products, in Russia on cars,
and in Ecuador on 940 different products. The EC re-introduced subsidies for the
export of milk and milk products. Most of these at least work within WTO rules
(e.g. raising tariffs within legal limits) but it remains likely that anti-dumping
duties will return as a battleground: 2008 saw a 28 percent rise in applications
over the previous year, the first rise since 2001.
National procurement has also been tied to fiscal policy. The February 2009
$800 billion fiscal stimulus bill of the new Obama administration included “Buy
American” clauses (e.g. for steel to be used in state projects), though the origi-
nal plan was modified in the face of potential retaliatory action by the EU. Paul
Krugman has argued that, in the absence of an internationally coordinated fiscal
stimulus, these clauses may not be protectionist in that they need not reduce
trade below the viable alternative. As he puts it: “My fiscal stimulus helps your
economy by increasing your exports — but you don’t share in my addition to
government debt.”48 He continues that if all countries were adopting a similar fis-
cal stance, “Buy American” would be unnecessary, but as they are not, it might
be a second best way to get the economy moving. This is a coherent argument
but it is politically impossible to limit the procurement bias to the appropriate
level. The danger is that a sequence of “special cases” will result in a flood (which
is why it is important to understand precisely why the precedent of the banks is
so inappropriate for other sectors).
It is difficult to prevent discriminatory interventions even within the EU.
Article 87 of the European Treaty prohibits state aid that may distort trade
between Member States but permits non-distortionary forms of aid. For example,
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the Commission requires that aid to banks should be: non-discriminatory, priced
according to market investor principles,49 and subject to behavioral restraints
against aggressive growth at the expense of non-subsidized banks.50 The last
needs interpreting carefully in the context of banks failing to make sufficient
loans (see section 2).
The EC has also invoked Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty, which permits
further, but strictly limited, aid intended to remedy a serious disturbance in the
economy of a Member State. In December 2008, it adopted a “temporary frame-
work” to allow Member States to tackle the effects of the credit crunch on the
real economy in a minimally distortive way.51 One aim was to restrict aid only
to firms in difficulty due to the financial crisis
and not allow aid for firms in long-term
decline.52 The EC rules are aimed at keeping the
playing field level internationally within
Europe. They are imperfectly adhered to, but
they provide a helpful model for national rules
in the current crisis.53
As a supranational organization, the EU is as
tight and powerful as international cooperation
comes, and it is backed by the legal force of a
strong treaty, yet it still has difficulty keeping its
members in line. The global institution charged
with reducing impediments to international trade, the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), has far less control over its membership and has a very limited man-
date.54 Nevertheless, it can have a significant reporting role for changes in
national trade policies, it can host talks to resolve disputes, and it can speak espe-
cially for those developing countries that have little retaliatory power in negoti-
ations.55 The lack of powers over sovereign states means that if diplomacy fails,
the only credible bargaining chip is retaliatory tariffs or subsidies. Of course,
actual trade wars are mutually destructive and the aim is that governments will
realize this so the threat does not have to be implemented. By late summer 2009,
it seems that, following the initial panic, the political urge for protectionist
measures has moderated.
Pressure on the mainstream implementation of antitrust and merger policy
comes both from short-term crisis management and, more insidiously, in an
urban myth that “too much competition” may have contributed to the crisis. In
earlier sections, I have given examples of crisis mergers and also rehearsed the
long-term benefits of a competitive economy. As the discussion of bank regula-
tion should make clear, the latter does not mean completely laissez-faire capital-
ism, but regulation targeted at allowing competition to thrive without creating
negative externalities. Recession will create challenges for competition policy in
each of the traditional areas:56
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• Agreements between firms: “Crisis cartels” are liable to form when
prices drop, and such coordination becomes addictive.57 Seductive
excuses may emerge along the lines of fixing prices in order to protect
the number of post-recession suppliers. However, such cartels are more
likely to delay recovery and fossilize an inefficient market structure.
Firms in an industry may also try to get together to agree an “ordered
reduction in capacity.” Such cartels have occasionally been allowed in
Europe under Article 81(3) in the past, but this would be misguided as
collusion is unlikely to select the most efficient market structure (see
section 3).58 A potential problem relates to fines for prosecuted cartels
because an otherwise appropriate fine might push a cartel member
into bankruptcy during a financial crisis. If fines are not adjusted
down, this may result in fewer firms in the market. However, this pos-
sibility should not be overplayed. Fines are generally set at a level that
is insufficient for optimal deterrence because they often do not even
cover the profits generated by cartels, let alone take proper account of
the low probability of detection.59 Cartels also allow inefficient firms
to survive in the market. Overall, it is likely to be undesirably anti-
competitive to adjust fines down in times of recession.
• Abuse by a single firm: There is a potential danger of a financially
strong firm taking the opportunity to foreclose a smaller or more
financially constrained rival. Recession, especially one induced by
financial crisis, may prove fertile ground for unfair means to tip a rival
over the edge. Competition authorities must be alert to such foreclo-
sure though they should not simply protect inefficient rivals. Low
demand growth may also facilitate entry deterrence strategies. For
some foreclosure problems, the appropriate remedy may be to require
access to a key facility or technology. The terms of such access are
then crucial to making the remedy effective. Should the current reces-
sion result in deflation, that could create problems for previously
agreed access terms.
• Mergers: The failing firm defense has been applied, at least implicitly,
for bank takeovers in the last year, though there have been fewer such
merger justifications in the real sector. If a firm is clearly going bank-
rupt, and if a particular merger is the least anticompetitive way to
ensure the survival of efficient resources in the industry, then such
mergers should be allowed.60 But this is simply a statement of sensible
policy in any circumstances and there is nothing special about the cur-
rent recession in this respect.61 It is only the frequency of this argu-
ment that may test the authorities. For mergers that do not involve a
failing firm, divestiture remedies may be made more difficult if appro-
priate buyers cannot be found due to financial constraints. Should this
arise, the fallback option has to be full prohibition at least pending
the emergence of viable buyers.62 There may also be a rise in oppor-
tunistic merger proposals with little economic logic but motivated by
differential access to finance and an anticipated rise in the stock mar-
ket. There is no particular reason why such mergers should raise com-
Competition Policy, Bailouts, and the Economic Crisis
Competition Policy International42
petition concerns. Finally, the economic justification of declining
demand and low margins may be offered to justify the need for a more
concentrated “equilibrium” market structure brought about by a hori-
zontal merger, but merger control should focus on expected demand
and not be transfixed by the last twelve months in appraising any
competition concerns.
V. Conclusion
History suggests that competition policy will be increasingly under threat as the
recession bites. Businesses under pressure will draw a plausible, though inappro-
priate, analogy between their own industry and banking bailouts. Those already
in trouble before the crisis will grab at the opportunity to plead their case.
Politicians seeking short-run popularity will think it is little sacrifice to cast aside
the long-term benefits of competition to bribe businesses to support their pet
schemes. And if the backlash against selfish, reckless bankers gets confused with
the democratic benefits of competitive markets, it may even become tempting
for politicians to knock competition policy directly as a populist gesture towards
centralized industrial policy.63
Careful analysis of the sources of the crisis and a clear understanding of the
unique double contagion in banking are crucial prerequisites for developing
appropriate policy responses. Certainly, taxpayer money was needed to put the
financial system on life support until it can pump sufficient finance on its own.
Tighter prudential regulation of banks is self-evidently necessary. I have further
argued that it would have been quicker, more direct, and less costly early in the
crisis to nationalize troubled banks and instruct
them to lend on commercial terms before conta-
gion into the real economy got out of hand.
However, no other sector of the economy justi-
fies such exceptional treatment and it would be
a great mistake to go backwards to replace com-
petition policy with interventionist industrial
policy. Similarly, it would be a mistake to impose
regulation beyond that necessary to reduce the
likelihood of a future financial crisis.
A strong and active competition policy,
including tight control of state aid, ensures that
business energies are naturally guided into satis-
fying consumer needs and are not diverted into cozying up to business rivals or
lobbying politicians. It has taken many years for enough politicians to appreciate
this. In most countries outside the United States, competition policy of sufficient
force has only begun to take root over the last decade. This makes it politically
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fragile and the misleading “precedent” of bailing out the banks must not be
allowed to make competition policy another casualty of the crisis.
1 The support of the Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. This paper has
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repercussions for many years to come.
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(December 2008), available online at www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org.
9 Confidence can also be important for firms whose purchasers do not receive the full benefit of the
product at the time of purchase (e.g. insurance, airline tickets booked in advance, warranties, network
products).
10 For example, see: Joseph Aharony & Itzhak Swary, Additional evidence on the information-base con-
tagion effects of bank failures, J. BANKING & FIN, 20, 57-69 (1996); Aigbe Akhigbe & Jeff Madura, Why
do contagion effects vary among bank failures? J. BANKING & FIN, 25, 657-80 (2001); Bong-Chan Kho,
Dong Lee & Rene Stulz, US banks, crises and bailouts: from Mexico to LTCM, AM. ECON. R. P&P, 90.2,
28-31 (2000).
11 See Lawrence J. White, Financial regulation and the current crisis: a guide for the antitrust communi-
ty, American Antitrust Institute working paper (2009) for an informed account of institutional prob-
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counterparty risk.
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No.17, pp.535-45, (2001).
16 In normal financial times, a firm whose product is not contaminated (or which can be swiftly made
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17 This is despite the huge costs. The principal bailout schemes in the EU totaled a nominal EURO 3 tril-
lion, which is 24 percent EU GDP. However, three-quarters of this has been in guarantees, most of
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Bruce Lyons
Vol. 5, No. 2, Autumn 2009 45
20 Nationalization would also have permitted clearing out the senior executives of failed banks without
undeserved compensation packages.
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Northern Rock during its first year in public ownership. See Office of Fair Trading, Northern Rock: the
impact of public support on competition, OFT1068, (March 2009).
22 This was a feature of the Japanese economy in the “lost years” of the 1990s.
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28 Viral Acharya & Julian Franks, Capital budgeting at banks: the role of government guarantees, OXERA
AGENDA (February 2009) argue that government guarantees of bank survival have driven the cost of
debt finance down to risk-free levels, which has encouraged excessive leverage.
29 Unfortunately, banks cannot be trusted to assess their own strategic risks. Paul Moore, former head of
group regulatory risk at HBOS was dismissed (with a reputed £0.5m gagging payment) for pointing out
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newspapers in relation to excessive risks in the trading of complex derivatives (e.g. SUNDAY TIMES,
February 22, 2009). The systemic problem is a failure to balance upside risk with the downside.
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32 Competitively neutral macroeconomic stimulus is necessary for Keynesian reasons. Subsidies for
retraining, regions, environmental protection, and fundamental R&D may rightly be given to correct a
specific externality or for distributional reasons. However, it is sometimes difficult to make the sharp
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tionary sectoral- or firm-specific aid.
33 See the EAGCP advice on Rescue and Restructuring Aid which was written shortly before the current
crisis: available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp.html.
34 This can be thought of as an option value of being in the industry should demand pick up. Similarly
entry is delayed by the option value of not having committed to the sunk costs of entry. See Avinash
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39 Beyond political impact, it tends to be declining industries with concentrated market structures that
have the greatest incentive to invest in lobbying activities because they face a smaller free-rider prob-
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